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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
FRANK FUOCO and ANNA
FUOCO,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
vs.
BENJAMIN H. 'VILLIAMS and
VERNA V. WILLIAMS,

No.
10362

Defendants-Respondents.

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF.

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is the second appeal from judgments of the
District Court of Salt Lake County, each favoring defendants, from an action brought by plaintiffs to quiet
title in a parcel of land approximately twenty feet
wide along plaintiffs' east boundary line and along
defendants' west boundary line, which is now and has
been for over fifty ( 50) years occupied and used by
defendants and their predecessors.
1

DISPOSITION IN THE LO\VER COURT
The Lower Court concluded that, in sending this
case back for a new trial in the first appeal by this same
plaintiff in this case, the Supreme Court did not intend
that the issue concerning the location of the ditch in
question be relitigated. G pon this basis the Lower Court
assumed the jury's determination, in the first trial,
with respect to the location of the ditch to be correct.
It was then determined, in the second trial, that the
only issue left to be decided was whether or not the
particular ditch in question was acquiesced in as a bound·
ary line by plaintiffs' predecessors and defendanh·
·and their predecessors for a long period of time. Thi~
issue was again resolved in favor of the defendants.
STATE.MEN'!' OF 'l'I-IE ISSUE TO BE
RESOLVED ON APPEAL
It must be determined whether or not the particular
ditch in question was acquiesced in as a boundary line
by plaintiffs' predecessors and by defendants' and their
predecessors for a sufficiently Jong period of time.

STATEl\ilENT OF FACTS
Plaintiffs and defendants are adjoining landown·
ers near 3900 South and I-Iighland Drive Streets in Salt
Lake County, Utah. Defendant, Ben 'Villiams, owns a
tract of land located south of 39th South Street on
the West side of Highland Drive Street. The plain·
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tiffs, in the year 1960, purchased a parcel of land immediately west of Respondents' property. (R. -!4, 47).
The twenty ( 20) foot strip in dispute involves the
placement of the boundary between their properties.
Defendant, llen Williams, has lived on this property
with his parents since he was a child. ( R. 3) . Prior
to 193..t, an irrigation ditch was <lug between the plaintiffs' and defendants' properties for the purpose of irrigating the plaintiffs' property. The defendants claim
their property runs west from Highland Drive Street
to the irrigation ditch dividing the properties in question and that the irrigation ditch has been acquiesced
in as a boundary line dividing the two parcels for well
over fifty ( 50) years and that said ditch is still in existence. At the previous trial the plaintiffs conceded
that the defendants had been using the parcel up to
the ditch since 1934, whereupon, the Lower Court limited the questions to be submitted to the jury to that
concerning the location of the ditch. That is whether
the irrigation ditch in question was located along Linc
AB or Line CD? The twenty-foot strip of land in dispute was shown on Exhibit P-1 by the letters "AB
and CD". "AB" was the boundary line claimed by the
defendants and "CD" was the line claimed by the plaintiffs. (Old R. 20). The jury, after hearing the evidence,
was taken to the premises to view the same. By Special
Yerdict, they found that the ditch forming the boundary
line between the two parcels of land was located along
the line All as claimed by defendants. ( 0 Id R. :J7) .
Based upon the findings of the jury, the Lower Court
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in the previous trial entered judgment for the defendants
quieting title, by acquiescence, in the defendants to the
disputed parcel. (Old R. 41-43). The plaintiffs appealed and the Supreme Court reversed the judgment
of the trial court and remanded such for a new trial,
stating that:
"The judge or jury should determine the matters of whether the ditch was acquiesced in over
a long period of time, as a boundary and not
simply as an irrigation medium." Fuoco vs. Williams, 15 Ut.2d 156, 389 P.2d 143.
At the new trial the Lower Court resolved the issue
of whether or not the particular irrigation ditch was
acquiesced in as a boundary line in favor of the defendants and it is from this judgment that the present
appeal is taken by the plaintiffs.

, ARGU~IENT IN AFFIRMANCE
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN
ITS FINDING THAT DEFENDANTS HAD
ACQUIRED Tl TLE BY ACQUIESCENCE.

A. The court correctly relied iipon the finding made b?J
the jury in the previous trial with respect to the location of the particular ditch involved in this controversy.
B. The defendants did prove the long, continued
existence of the said ditch rz.'f a rnonument definitclJI
establishing a boundary line rnutually recognized
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by appellants' predecessors and by defendants and
their predecessors as such.
A. The court correctly relied upon the finding made by
the jury in the previous trial with respect to the location of the particular ditch involved in this controversy.
In the earlier Supreme Court decision, Fuoco vs.
Williams, 15 Ut.2d 156, 389 P.2d 143, in which the
judgment for defendant, Benjamin H. 'Villiams was
reversed and remanded for a new trial, the court said:
"The court erred in telling the jury that the
only question was the location of the small irrigation ditch, since such presentation to the jury
was based on the assumption that the irrigation
ditch was dug where it was for the purpose of
establishing a boundary and not for the sole purpose of irrigating the land."
The court further stated:
"The judgment of the trial court is reversed
and remanded for a new trial, with instructions
to the effect that the judge or jury should determine the matters of whether the ditch was acquiesced in over a long period of time, as a boundary
and not simply as an irrigation medium."
It is from this language and similar language
throughout the opinion that the lower court in the present trial correctly concluded that it was not the intent
of the Supreme Court that the issue with respect to the
location of the ditch be relitigaited.
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The latter above-quoted statement of the Supreme
Court refers specifically to the issue of acquiescence in
the ditch (referring here to that ditch located by the
jury in the previous trial) as a boundary line and makes
no reference to the issue of location. From this language it would seem that the Lower Court was correct
in its interpretation of the Supreme Court's previous
decision.
It is the law in Utah that an issue which has been
properly litigated in a court of competent jurisdiction
is conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with
them and cannot be relitigated in another court by the
same parties in an action upon the same matter. Matthews v. Matthews et al. (142), 102 Ut. 428, 132 P.2d
II I. In the Matthews case the court said:

"Public policy requires that parties ought not
to be permitted to litigate the same issue more
than once, and, that when a fact has been judicially determined by a court of competent jurisdiction or an opportunity for such trial has been
given, the judgment of the court so long as it
remains unreversed, should be conclusive upon
the parties and those in privity with them in law
or estate."
It is respectfully submitted that the issue concerning the location of the ditch was not open to relitigation
in the present trial.

B. The defendants did prove the long, contim1;ed
existence of the said ditch as a monument definitely
establishing a buundarv line mutually recognized
6

by appellants' predecessors and by defendants and

their predecessors as such.

Where there is no proof of an actual agreement
the court has relied upon the doctrine of boundary by
acquiescence and implied an agreement if certain elements be shown to exist. The elements which must be
shown by the person claiming title by acquiescence are:
( 1) occupation up to a visible line marked definitely
by monuments, fences or buildings, ( 2) acquiescence
in the division line as the boundary, ( 3) acquiescence
for a long period of time and ( 4) acquiescence by adjoining landowners.
Where the preceding requirements are met, a rebuttable presumption arises that the parties have agreed
the boundary should be the one in which they have acquiesced, wholly apart from whether or not an actual
express agreement was made. If the preswnption arises
the burden shifts and it becomes incumbent upon the
party who assails the title by acquiescence to show by
competent evidence that a boundary was not thus established.
Fuoco vs. Williams, 15 Utah 2d 156, 389 P.2d
143; King vs. Frank, 14 Utah 135, 378 P.2d 893; Nunley vs. Walker, 13 Ut.2d 105, 369 P.2d 1117; Affleck
vs. Morgan, 12 Ut.2d 200, 36-i P.2d 663; Harding
vs. Allen, 10 Ut.2d 370, 353 P.2d 911; Urown vs. lHilliner, 120 Utah 16, 232 P.2d 202; Glenn vs. Whitney,
116 Utah 267, 209 P.2d 257; Ringwood vs. Bradford,
7

2 Utah 2d 119, 269 P.2d 1053; Hummel vs. Young,
l Utah 2d 337, 265 P.2d 410; 3 Utah Law Review.
Plaintiffs contend that defendants failed to prove
a "mutual recognition" of the particular irrigation
ditch as a boundary.
An irrigation ditch can become a boundary line
or monument if such be the intention of the adjoining
landowners. Monuments include such natural objects
as mountains, streams, trees, etc., or artificial objects
such as roads, fences, walls, ditches and other similar
matters marked or placed on the ground by the hand
of man. 12 Am J ur 2d (Boundaries) Sec. 4 & 5, pages
549 thru 551.
The record is clear that l\'Ir. Williams, the defendant, and his predecessors, under claim of title, occupied
and used the property lying immediately east of the
ditch bank far in excess of twenty-five ( 25) years to
the exclusion of all others.
Plaintiffs' witness, Owen Sanders, testified that the
property west of defendants' old barn to the east of
the ditch in question was used by defendants and their
predecessors as a place to throw refuse, manure, as a
lane over which to drive their wagons and hayracks,
as a place to grow apple trees and for gardening.
(R. 81, 82, 85). Mr. Sanders further testified that
to his knowledge defendants and their predecessors
were the only persons ever to use the property east
of the present ditch as it runs parallel to the fence
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now m existence. (R. 86, 87). Mr. Frank Young,
witness for plaintiffs, testified that the property west
of the barn and to the east of the ditch was used by
defendants and their predecessors for gardening, to
raise corn, to grow fruit trees, in part for a corral, etc.
(R. 109, llO). Mr. Young also testified that he has
never seen anyone other than defendants or their predecessors doing anything with the property east of the
fence line as it is now constructed. (R. ll7). Mr. H.
Leland Christensen, another witness for plaintiff,
testified that he remembered defendants placing corn
shocks on the west end of their property. (R. 137).
Defendant Benjamin H. Williams and his sister, Mrs.
Afton W. Marker, both testified that defendants and
their predecessors had used and occupied the property
in question for over 20 years-more nearly 50 yearsto the exclusion of all others under claim of title to
the property. (R. 7, 8, 12, 28-34, 58, 59, 60, 62).
The Supreme Court in its earlier decision, Fuoco
vs. Williams, supra, on this matter, stated that:
"The plaintiffs conceded that the defendants
had been cultivating the ground up to the ditch
for oiver 20 years."
It is respectfully submitted that defendants were occupying and using all of the property from their east
boundary along Highland Drive west to the ditch in
dispute, to the exclusion of all others.
l\fr. Frank Young, witness for plaintiffs, testified
that Mr. Butterworth, former owner of the tract now
9

owned by plaintiff, Frank Fuoco, attempted to raise
corn and potatoes at one time. (R. Ill). As was pointed
out, supra, Mr. Young also testified that he has never
seen anyone other than defendants or their predecessors
using the property east of the ditch in question and the
present fence line as it is now constructed. (R. 117).
It is logical to infer from this testimony that Mr.
Butterworth farmed only up to the ditch and would
seem to indicate that Mr. Butterworth probably used
the water from the ditch in question to irrigate his
crops. Defendant, Ben Williams, testified that Leone
LeCheminant grew crops on what is now the Fuoco
property up to the west side of the ditch in question
for two or three years. ( R. 38) . This fact is also recog·
nized by plaintiffs in their brief at page 8. Plaintiffs'
witness, Mr. H. Leland Christensen, testified that he
farmed what is now the plaintiffs' property at one
tin1e and did use water for irrigating from the par·
ticular ditch in question. ( R. 135) . This fact was also
recognized by plaintiffs' witness, Mr. Young, in his
testimony. (R. 112).
Plaintiffs' witness, Mrs. Grace D. Young, tes·
tified that because of a hump located on what is now
the plaintiffs' property the land was difficult to irri·
gate and flooding would sometimes occur when an
attempt was made to irrigate this property. Perhaps
this is an explanation for plaintiffs' predecessors letting
the land grow up in weeds for many years.
The fact that all witnesses testified to the existence
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of the ditch in question would seem to be evidence
enough of its visibility.
Mutual recognition of a boundary line may be
shown by acquiescence over a long period of time. It
is not incumbent upon the defendants to show an
express agreement between themselves and plaintiffs'
predecessors in the title in order to prevail. An implied
recognition of a boundary line may be supplied by
the passage of time. Fuoco vs. Williams, 15 U t.2d
156, 389 P.2d 143; King vs. Fronk, 14 Ut.2d 135, 378
P.2d 893; 3 Utah Law Review.
Plaintiffs' predecessors and the defendants and
their predecessors have for many years intended that
this irrigation ditch constitute the boundary line. The
testimony indicates that the ditch was constructed along
the east side of the plaintiffs' property for the purpose of irrigating that property and was placed along
what was considered to be its east boundary. (Old
R.114 (New R. 4, 7, 10, 90, 126, 130). Since the
property of the parties slopes from the east to the
west, it was assumed many years ago that the ditch
in question was on the boundary line of the two parties.
It is illogical that, at the time the irrigation ditch was
constructed, it was not placed on what plaintiffs contend is the boundary line, approximately twenty feet
east of the position where it was actually located,
unless the adjacent property owners consi<lered the
boundary line to be where the ditch was located. The
land at the time the ditch was constructed was pri-
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marily farm land. The feeder ditch or canal serving
the plaintiffs' property flowed from the east to west
to the northeast corner of plaintiffs' property. It would
have been a simple matter to bring the ditch across
the road from north to south at the actual record
boundary to irrigate all of the tract if the boundary line
were not considered to have been in the location as
claimed by defendants. When land is being used as
farm land and is being served by irrigation water, it
would be unwise, to say the least, for the owner of
the land not to construct his irrigation ditch on what
he treated as his property line, so that he would not
lose the use of any of his property through lack of
water. It is not logical to say that plaintiffs' predecessors, to be neighborly, allowed a twenty-foot strip of
their farmland to lie east of the ditch where it could
not be irrigated so that their neighbors could use the
land.
Plaintiffs' predecessors iu title made no objection
and it was assumed by others living in the area that
the ditch in question constituted the boundary line
between the two properties. The plaintiffs have lived in
this neighborhood for many years themselves and have
owned and tilled the land adjacent on the south of the
property they recently acquired from Butterworth.
They knew of the sale ten or more years ago on the
south part of the Williams' property to one Hansen
(the north part of said tract was conveyed to respondents by the said deed of 1950), and know that the
west line of the tract claimed and occupied by Hansen
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had been tightly fenced by him since his acquisition
of that part of the Williams property. (R. 49, 60,
87); that said fence was in direct line with the fence
constructed by defendants conveniently close to and
on the east bank of the irrigation ditch of plaintiffs',
which had been acquiesced in and recognized for nearly
fifty years as the division line of these properties.
Hansen had also constructed a concrete wall and fence
along the boundary of the property between the lot
he had acquired from Williams' parents and that of
defendants. This wall extended all the distance to
the southwest corner of the land claimed by defendants, down to the said ditch on the line AB. (R. 11,
12, 61, 68, 79). The whole or former Williams tract,
as it existed, before the south part thereof was sold
to Hansen, had a common west boundary, and with
the lands acquired by plaintiffs recognized all of these
years. The ditch extends the entire distance of this
old west line ofthe Williams property, and has done
so for many years.
Plaintiffs had personal knowledge, before they
bought the tract to the west of the Williams tract from
Butterworth, that this line had already existed for all
the years they had lived in the neighborhood. They tilled
the land immediately south of the south side of the
old Williams property. Plaintiff, Frank Fuoco, indicated in his testimony ·that he did not farm the 25 foot
strip in dispute located just east of the irrigation ditch
because he did not know it was his until the recent
survey was conducted. (R. 53). Plaintiffs did not in-
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tend to buy any land lying east of this line from Butterworth, but claim to find, after surveying out the
description in the Butterworth deed to them, that they
had acquired twenty feet more than they had expected
to acquire. They now desire that the boundary line be
changed and moved back to the east about twenty feet,
after it had been used, acquiesced in, acknowledged,
and recognized as the property line for nearly fifty
years.
Defendant, Benjamin H. \Villiams, testified that
either he or his father had leased what is now the Fuoco
property during the period from 1923 or 1924 to 1937
and one other year sometime between 1940 and 1959.
( R. 37). Defendants further testified that only the
crop returns on the land west of the ditch were divided
on a crop-share basis with their lessor. As to the proceeds from the crop raised east of the ditch, ~Ir. \Villiams testified that defendants and their predecessors
retained all proceeds. (R. 40). Defendant, Ben \Villiams, also testified that the ditch in question was used
to irrigate what is now the plaintiffs' property lying
to the west of the ditch. (R. 39). Plaintiffs presented
no evidence whatsoever to contradict this testimony. It
would seem that the division of crop receipts would be
significant circumstantial evidence of the acquiescence
of plaintiffs' predecessors in the ditch as the boundary
line.
The landlord-tenant rule would not be controlling
here since defendants were lessees for only a small

14

portion of the period during which defendants claim
the ditch was acquiesced in as a boundary line.
As was pointed out, supra, what is now the plaintiffs' property west of the ditch in question, was farmed
at different intervals of time by .Mr. Butterworth,
Mr. H. Leland Christensen, and Mr. Leone LeCheminant. The fact that others farmed what is now the
plaintiffs' property only up to the ditch in question is
significant evidence of the acquiescence of plaintiffs'
predecessors in the ditch as a boundary line.
Plaintiffs contend that the ditch in question was
not a permanent land mark and hence does not fall
within the definition of a "monument." In support
of their contention, on page 14 of their brief plaintiffs
state that def end ant, Ben \Villi ams, admitted the ditch
had been moved. This is not true. Though defendant
stated that the ditch could have moved one or two feet
either to the east or west he stated that to his knowledge it had not been so moved. ( R. 23, 33). Testimony
indicated that periodically the ditch required cleaning
if it was to be of satisfactory use. (R. 34). The record
points out that one way of cleaning the ditch is to
plow it out. (R. 34). It is possible that as a result of
this cleaning process or of erosion taking place that
the ditch might shift slightly to the east or the west.
Defendant, Ben Williams, was merely being realistic
when he testified that the ditch could have shifted to
the east or west--0ne or two feet.
As was pointed out, supra, the location of the ditch
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was not an issue in the present trial; however, plain.
tiffs insist on reviving this issue in their current appe].
late brief (page 12). Since it was determined by the
Lower Court that it was not the intent of the Supreme
Court that the issue concerning the location of the ditch
in question be relitigated, the fact that certain of plaintiffs' witnesses testified in the present trial that the
ditch was not located where the jury had determined
it to be would seem to be immaterial. As to that issue
the jury's finding in the previous suit would be binding and the doctrine of res judicata should be applied.
l\iiatthews vs. Matthews et al., 102 Ut. 428, 132 P.2d
lll.

It might be noted, however, that the testimonies
of plaintiffs' \vitnesses in the present trial, with respect
to the location of the ditch in question, conflict either
with their testimonies given in the previous trial and
are inconsistent with each other in some respects in the
present trial.

At one point in his testimony plaintiff, Frank
Fuoco, testified that he at no time had knowledge of
any ditch in the area in dispute. (R. 46, 47). Plain·
tiffs' witness, Mrs. Young, testified that plaintiff, Mr.
Fuoco, at one time attempted to irrigate by using that
ditch, which she referred to as being the original ditch,
which she testified ran along the west boundary of the
'Villiams' property. (R. 129, 131). In the previous
trial, where the issue as to the location of the ditch
was in dispute, plaintiffs' witness, Owen Sander, lo·
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cated the ditch along Line AB by drawing a line with
a dark pencil on Exhibit P-1 down the north side of
the road, then crossing the road to Point A on the
Exhibit, then south to his property. (R. of previous
trial at 113). Mr. Frank Young, witness for plaintiff,
at one point in his testimony states that the water
ran south across the road and then turned west and
after running west for some distance it could be turned
into a ditch running south across the east side of what
is now the Fuoco property. (R. 107).

If any confusion exists as to the exact surveyed
location of the east bank of said ditch, it is cured and
made unmistakeably clear and precise by that description in the judgment rendered by the lower court in
the previous trial which describes, with meticulous care,
the legal or metes and bounds description of the property found to be owned by defendants. This is the
description of the property set forth in the warranty
deed whereby the mother of the defendant, Ben 'Villiams, conveyed this land to him in 1950. (R. 11).
It is the same tract occupied solely and claimed by
defendants and the parents of the defendant, Benjamin
H. Williams, for more than 30 - more nearly 50 consecutive years. It is the tract upon which defendants have paid the taxes since the tract was conveyed
in 1950 to them. (R. 11). The evidence is uncontradicted on these items, and the testimony adduced at
the trial was clear and unequivocal relating to the years
of occupancy by defendants, and as to their said long
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years of tilling and caring for this tract as their own
property to the exclusion of all persons.
Recognition of a boundary line by adjoining property owners may be shown by implication. Nunley v~.
Walker, 13 Ut.2d 105, 369 P.2d 117. The defendants
may acquire title by acquiescence if their use has been
for a sufficient length of time. King vs. Fronk, 14
Ut.2d 135, 378 P.2d 893; Nunley vs. Walker, supra;
Affleck vs. 1\iforgan, 12 Ut.2d 200, 364 P.2d 663;
Harding vs. Allen, 10 Ut.2d 370, 353 P.2d 991.
This Honorable Court stated in the case of King
vs. Fronk, supra:
"Besides a, visible, persisting boundary having
been shown over a long period of time is con·
vincing evidencee of an intended or acquiesced
in boundary. Under such circumstances, it would
seem that in the nature of things, it is incumbent
upon him who assails it to show by competent
evidence that a boundary was not thus es tab·
lished ... "
'Vhether or not defendants' and plaintiffs' pre<le·
cessors "mutually recognized" the ditch as a boundary
between the parcels is atnply demonstrated by their
acquiescense in the ditch as a boundary line far in excess
of twenty-five (25) years. It was only after the y~ar
1950 when the appellants purchased the property lo·
cate<l west of the ditch in question that this contest arose.
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CONCLUSION
At the first trial on this matter the trial judge determined that there was but one issue of fact in dispute
between the parties. That issue was the location, in
regard to the disputed tract, of an irrigation ditch that
had been serving the appellants' property for over
twenty-five years. Plaintiffs, Mr. and Mrs. Fuoco,
maintained that the old ditch was no longer in the same
location and that it had originally been located along
Line CD of Exhibit P-1. Defendants contended that
the ditch was the same as that in existence now and
that such was located along Line AB. This issue was
resolved by the jury in favor of the defendants. On
appeal, by plaintiffs, this Honorable Court reversed
the judgment and remanded such for a new trial stating:
"The judge or jury should determine the matters of whether the ditch was acquiesced in over
a long period of time, as a boundary and not
simply as an irrigation medium."
Though testimony was offered at the time of the
new trial concerning the location of the irrigation ditch
the Lower Court concluded that it was not the intent
of this Honorable Court on remand that this issue be
relitigated. The Lower Court then determined that the
only issue to be resolved at the new trial was whether
or not this particular ditch had been acquiesced in for
a sufficiently long period of time as a boundary line.
This latter issue was heard by the court sitting without
a jury and was correctly resolved in favor of the defendants. This is the second appeal by the plaintiffs.
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Plaintiffs failed to present sufficient competent
evidence to refute defendants' claim to the land lying
cast of the ditch. The record clearly demonstrates that
plaintiffs' predecessors arn1 defendants and their prede·
cesors for well over twenty-five ( 25) years acquiesced
in this particular ditch as a bouudary line. It is clear
from the testimony of the various witnesses that defendants have used and occupied the land in dispute
up to this ditch under daim of title and to the exclusion
of all others during this long period of time. The testimony of plaintiffs' witnesses also clearly indicates that
plaintiffs' predecessors were well aware of the ditch
and that they or their tenants during various intervals
of time farmed up to and, only up to, the west bank of
the ditch in question and used water from said ditcb
for purposes of irrigation.
The defendants' mother, m deeding the property
to the defendants' included the disputed parcel when
she conveyed to them in the year 1950. This convey·
ance is another indication that the respondents an<l
their predecessors had considered and treated the irri·
gation ditch as being the boundary line between par·
ties' respective tracts of land. Further, the fact that
IIansen, after his acquisition of the south part of the
\Villiams property, constructed a fence on what he
considered at that time to be his west boundary, directly in line with the cast bank of the ditch in question,
as is indicated by Line AB on Exhibit P-1, is evidence
that it was assumed by others living in the area that
the ditch in question constituted the boundary.
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The property in question has changed in value considerably from that of farm property to that of commercial property because it now adjoins a shopping
center. In the case of King vs. Fronk, supra, this IIonorable Court appropriately describes the motivating
factor in the instant case when it stated:
''The rub comes when, after many years, land
value appreciation tempts a test of the vulnerability of a claimed ancient boundary."
Ilespondcnts respectfully submit that the judgment should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

:MILTON A. 01\:IAN
701 Continental Bank Bldg.

Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorney for Defendants
and Respondents
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